Maalox for Madoff

You are inevitably aware of the nature and magnitude of the fraud: $50b lost in a Ponzi scheme, according to Madoff’s own confession, the exact amount remaining to be determined. The scam is different from any of those which were recently revealed, as it is based on an absence of due diligence rather than an absence of regulations. The most interesting aspect is that a man, for over 20 years, was able to convince most members of an entire profession he could fulfill their dreams, and maintain their unwilling complicity, by offering high and constant returns insensitive to market conditions and generating high fees.

Asset managers – a motto in this blog – are totally unable to produce – as advertised – long term returns for their clients at higher rates than economic growth corrected by inflation, while grossing for themselves between 2 to 4% of the mass under management. They know they cannot achieve this by themselves individually or as a profession globally. They are ready, however, to believe in exceptions in others, and prefer to leverage such exceptions for their own profit rather than question their reliability. Although betting on exceptions made into an average phenomenon is certainly not the soundest of ideas, it seems a good way for average people to reach impossible goals.The most reckless and/or naive  among money managers started doing this in the 80s. The 90s turned it into an industry trend.

It is true, after all, that at any given moment, a handful of asset managers have beaten the market for a long time and made an impressive fortune. The best known are Warren Buffet and George Soros, others are Louis Bacon, Paul Tudor Jones, Julian Robertson and …Bernard Madoff. Obviously, not all are crooks like the later. Most are simply lucky. Some are even lucky and shrewd. Luck is a very important element in what is essentially a random distribution of outcomes. It is a well known fact that the ‘Monkey’ investment (i.e. random stock picking with positions held over a long period of time) produces results that are strictly superior to those of average professional asset managers. One of the reasons for this is that the Monkey is not concerned with generating fees by a fast turnover of portfolios, and carries fewer costs. Shrewdness cannot hurt: Warren Buffet has shown that Grand Pa’s type defiance against anything sophisticated, together with a witty wording of principles, can be good for business. Shrewdness may also reach some rationality when arbitrating between market discrepancies over identical assets. This last method – the best one – is unfortunately limited in scope and self-cannibalizing, as the more discrepancies are used the less remain to be exploited.

In any case, as these exceptions do exist, the advertized concept became: our bank (or financial entity of some sort), is formed of professionals capable not of outstanding results (something as a matter of fact difficult to believe) but of identifying outstanding independent asset managers. Asset managers picking soon replaced ‘stock picking’. The hunt was supposed to be so difficult and tricky that funds of funds had to be created and a whole new profession of distributors of funds invented. These new distributors of funds did not need any specific training, except in hunting, golfing and/or gourmet dining. Most came either from banking mid-management or impoverished aristocratic families. All they had to do was to be lavish enough in their invitations and jolly enough in their conversations to become your friend (if you are a ‘high net-worth individual’) and your banker’s friend (if you are not). In this way they could foster trust, a necessary item when dealing with expensive opacity.

From this moment on, bankers enjoyed a wonderful streak. Salaries paid to well trained asset managers for managing your money according to your own actual needs could now be eliminated. Younger, better looking and less paid account managers were in charge of convincing you to accept the new products: house funds mimicking successful funds, funds of funds, and ‘alternative’ funds that few could understand and less could explain. Not only these products came to the bankers at no cost, but they also started receiving kickbacks (more politely called ‘retrocessions’ from brokerage fees), on top of the fees you were officially paying (entrance fees, redemption fees, management fees, performance fees, custody fees). Your banker friend being your friend he could be nice with you and lift one of these many fees generated by your own money.

All such funds were supposed to have long track records showing steady returns and outperforming markets. When the emphasis is on performance, the track record is usually limited to an ad hoc selection of the best performing among a series of sister funds. When the emphasis is on the duration of the track record, a scarce item, a promise is made to provide funds by the most successful managers. This is where Madoff played his best cards. In order to create the proper hype, he made people believe that his funds were ‘closed’ and would not accept any new investors. In other words the most open of funds (what can be more open than a Ponzi scheme?) were sold as closed. Letting you in was a favor made to friends.

In a way, you can consider it good marketing: against all expectations, the ‘Dom Perignon’ is the best sold champagne in the world (it really is). Yet, this has had far reaching consequences. One cannot be too picky with favors. Illiquidity (redemption notice on the last day of each month, 35 days to redeem, then 30 days to obtain payment) was overseen. Complete opacity of the underlying assets was accepted as an effect of a necessary confidentiality (after all funds of funds have even more opacity as they refuse not only to disclose the nature of the assets – your assets- but even sometimes the name of the asset managers). Absence of understanding of the techniques being used was partly an effect of opacity. Absence of real guaranties, by the formal waiving of most rights, seemed a natural condition for products reserved to ‘sophisticated investors’. Absence of alignment with the client‘s interests was hidden, as most banks would prefer to cash-in their fees rather than include such products in their own portfolio, or simply denied (‘the managers have their own money in the fund’). Market risks involved were covered by distortions in the terminology: sheer speculation was called ‘arbitrage’, build-up of leveraged open positions were called ‘hedging’.

Facing such hype and making money at every step, the financial industry forgot all diligence: money managers trusted their bank, banks trusted distributors, distributors trusted custodians, and custodians trusted auditors. All trusted their own fees to come, and no one checked. This confederation of dunces became so powerful that regulators and authorities had to look somewhere else.

This is how an average man who certainly started his career with reasonably good performances, based on a right combination of luck and insider’s information, could then become a crook when his investments started going array. He is probably not alone in the present state of the financial industry. But we shall know quite soon, as no scam can resist for long the current storm. Attorneys are likely to be the only winners when one of the largest class-action ever starts, including the SEC among the many defendants. Last but not least, beneficiaries of a Ponzi scheme are liable to give their returns back to indemnify the last comers and victims. Considering the exceptional duration and magnitude of the scam,  it is going to be very messy.

There is little doubt that the money management industry is going to change dramatically after such events.  After a period of attempted resistance, bankers who had cautiously stored their profits in Treasury bonds while their own (now infuriated) clients are the first victims of their policies, will have to take some commercial (or legal) losses. Insurance companies, custodians, auditors and governments will contribute. Most hedge funds boutiques will have to shut down. Funds of funds will slowly vanish . Regulations will be drastically reinforced. Opacity will be banned and kickbacks will disappear. Bankers’ and managers’ responsibilities will be increased. Asset management will cease to be the cure-all for banks who had opted-out from lending. Risks awareness will be somewhat restored. Bankers will start playing serious golf or  kill less game.  Perhaps, the day will come when the best offer on the market will be a guarantied loss of 1% per year in real terms: a serious improvement indeed.

This is how the world goes.