Rationality vs. Nationalism in the Palestinian conflict – Part II
Posted by Harry Stotle on January 20, 2009
Public opinion is as strong a force as it can be blind. Sides are usually taken according to the proximity of the respective propaganda sources. Historical rectifications are conceived as aggressions, and self-righteousness reigns on all parts. A rational approach can still be attempted, with limited chances of success. It is however the last resort left for not dying or killing based on utterly wrong reasons. The worst in never certain, after all.
Let’s start by putting the historical background aside, as it is unable (as we have seen in the previous post) to show us anything else than the extreme relativity of the foundations of all opposing claims. The present issue is not anymore the historical legitimacy of Israel or of a Palestinian State, which is simply dry wood for the flaming ideologies. We should rather consider the rationality and efficiency of the strategies now determining the future of Palestine and Israel.
The basic objective fact is the following: although at this time militarily unmovable, Israel is facing a lethal danger if the state of war persists indefinitely, because of Israel’s vital dependence on external supports which in turn depend on public opinions that are emotionally inclined to back victims. In an environment where nationalism feeds political analysis with its own notions, when confronted to a conflict between State-haves and State-have-nots, public opinion tends to back the have-nots. Even Congress can abandon a cause it was supposedly ready to die for, when a shift in public opinion starts blowing the whistle of a new electoral tone. Gradually, appalling TV images undermine the most solid positions: South Vietnam, the former ‘bulwark of our liberties’ is long gone and only one example of what it is fact a general rule when you look at it close enough. Many Israeli leaders know it; most Islamic extremists know it too. For this very reason, and sometimes for other motives, most Israeli are aware of the necessity for Israel to make a Palestinian State happen, and most Islamic extremists are convinced they will get one sooner rather than later.
The issue therefore boils down to the negotiating muscle of the respective parties. The Palestinian strength rests almost exclusively on the public opinion battle, a battle in which Israel has been continuously losing ground since the First Intifada. The weakening of PLO, the war in Lebanon, the building of the wall, the retaliatory incursions into the West Bank, the one-sided withdrawal from the Gaza Strip followed by siege and reinvasion, all carried much more negative consequences than positive ones from the public opinion standpoint, no matter how much sense they might have made for other purposes.
Symmetrically, the strategy adopted by the Islamic Extremists has recently shown to be much more efficient than the one of the Moderates. It consists in deliberately worsening the situation through aggressive martyrdom: provoking the opponent in order to become a martyr in the eyes of public opinion. Such strategy, the (non-aggressive) roots of which are to be found in the Christian martyrs (who took over the Roman Empire), in the pacifist Indian martyrs (who took the upper hand against the British Empire) or even in the martyrdom of Haile Selassie facing Mussolini, is extremely powerful and should not be underestimated. Triggering a full scale invasion with numerous civilian victims, by launching psychologically dreadful and yet physically almost harmless series of homemade missiles (3 dead at this time), is almost as winning a strategy as having children throw stones at tanks. It is much more efficient than the ill-designed methods of Al-Qaeda (spectacular destruction of civilian targets, and human bombs, especially women or children) which turn to be somewhat counter-productive for the goal pursued by their authors (i.e. the elimination of the United Sates from the Islamic world).
Countering such a politique du pire cannot be done by simply accusing opponents to be terrorists, criminals, primitive or stupid, even when they are. It can definitely not be done by a sheer repression; hoping to exhaust the opponent’s determination while actually reinforcing it (Please note that Hamas leaders gave themselves the pleasure of initially rejecting the ceasefire in their favor, and asking for more martyrdom). It can only be done by offering terms that public opinion – right or wrong – will consider fair.
The core of such terms has been known for a while, and it is probably a mistake to keep them under the table in order only to hopefully maintain one’s bargaining position. To be viable, the future Palestinian state must be territorially unified, have a critical size and the capacity to economically and socially absorb the refuges under decent conditions. It must be exempt from enclaves justifying major claims. Territorially, this implies not only the restitution of almost all Occupied Territories, but also some concession on the status of Jerusalem. A delicate issue seems to be the Right of Return, yet more apparent than real: the combination of a moratory with a viable Palestinian State should logically lead a majority of former refugees to waive it. Palestinian concessions will be essentially limited to the formal acceptance of the negotiated borders and the actual banning of terrorist activities, under the control and assistance of an adapted International police force.
It is likely that the next Israeli government and the new US administration will give it a try to a certain degree, the main problem being to find counterparts to negotiate with, in the absence of a strong moderate Palestinian leadership. As it is neither in the Hamas nor in its Iranian backer’s immediate interest to pursue a rapid peace which would reduce considerably their role and influence, the only sound option for Israel is to create the conditions for a political comeback of the Fatah. This could hardly be achieved in the absence of an intermediary phase during which the extend of the territorial concessions that are being considered is publicized, the settlements are methodically dismantled, response to attacks while remaining firm is restrained and targeted from a distance, the daily life of Arab Israeli and Palestinian workers in Israel – an important link – is proactively improved, and the reelection of the few Arab Israeli MPs facilitated.
This is of course faster said than done. At least this sets a reasonable course of action, foreign to ideologies and partisanship. The coming elections in Israel and the visible aspiration of the new US administration to get out of the hornet’s nest give it at least some minimal possibility.
At some point, for peace to eventually take place the Iranian pressure will have to be released. I doubt mere ‘conversations’ will do the job, unless a trump is put on the table. The only pacific one I could see is the prospect of an International conference on the global denuclearization of the Middle-east, which is no not entirely impossible as a good way to temper the region.
If none of this happens, if no real attempt is made to enact a reasonable plan prepared by intermediary phase, Israel will survive but its situation will continue to degrade. Both local populations will continue to undergo unsafety or misery and extremists will thrive.
I am not sure bookmakers would bet on a rational development rather than an intensification of nationalism. Yet, who knows?
