Persian dreams

Is there any limit to how deeply Washington can misunderstand the world? Persia is a showcase for the negative answer. Since the 1953 coup at least, now officially acknowledged as the US operation ‘Ajax’, American foreign policy has been going from one misconception to another: notably, from a candid Carter administration pressuring the Shah into exile and triggering Khomeini’s revolution, to the staggering reinforcement of Iran by the destruction of its nemesis and main regional counter-weight, Iraq. Now, when the US position in the Middle-east would have seemed to reach its nadir, a series of clumsy moves indicate that things could still worsen.

The Obama administration is wise in trying to defuse the explosive situation left by the last presidency. This is not a good reason, however, to play naively in the opponent’s hand. The belief that the mere prospect of entering in Washington’s good grace will move the Iranians to the tears and will be sufficient to get their badly needed assistance or neutrality, looks like the idea of a dreamer or a madman. It is, though, what the DOD seems to have in mind.

NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Bantz J. Craddock just came up with the astonishing idea to ‘allow’ NATO state members to ask Teheran for supply routes into Afghanistan. Why not ask Pyongyang for intelligence support about China? General Craddock avoided requesting personally Iran’s assistance in better invading a neighboring country, and hinted that Germany or France would be welcome to make the first move. After an initial chuckle, Teheran might in fact take the ‘bait’: wouldn’t it be nice to have a say in any further deployment of NATO countries in Afghanistan? After all, the more the Iranians facilitate the switching of troops from Iraq to Afghanistan (at the considered levels which are way too low to bring a real military control), the easier it becomes for them to take over Iraq directly or by proxy. In the event you believe this was a whim from some isolated general, please note that the US Treasury one-sidedly labeled the Kurdish resistance movement against Iran a ‘Terror Organization’ on the next day.

It is difficult to understand why Iran is such a puzzle for the United States. The simple reading of a history book should be enough to make it clear that Persia is used to being a unified super-power (the only one who could resist the Roman empire), with a long patriotic – now nationalistic – tradition, and viewing itself as a matrix of culture. The basic mistake is to see a contradiction between an appetite for modern technologies and the safekeeping of local traditions, including Shiite Islam. Iran is not interested in becoming a part of the Western world, as many Iranians are convinced that US technological superiority is temporary and hides a cultural deficiency. It is therefore perfectly logical to combine an industrial and military modernization, financed by enormous mineral resources, with an effort to promote Shiite values all over the world, starting with the Middle-east and central Asia, the two mains parts of Persia’s courtyard. As long as the curve of American decline –which is seen as inevitable – does not cross Iran’s recovery curve, Teheran can rely on a strategy which has proven its efficiency: war by proxy and martyrdom. This low-cost method was capable of creating chaos at will in Lebanon and in Iraq, leaving Iran as a key-player in both places. It is now applied also with success In Palestine; where Israel is considered by Iran as nothing but a US stronghold. This strategy could be turned anytime against Saudi Arabia and the emirates, once the Palestinian showdown is settled under terms found acceptable by Teheran.

It is now too late to prevent Iran from building up a Mesopotamian hegemony after the departure of US forces. Western presence in Afghanistan does not represent a threat for Iran, as only massive investments (an option now closed by the economic crisis), not additional (and yet insufficient) troops could have made a US success conceivable there.

To complete the picture, the Russian-built nuclear reactor of Bushehr will be operational by the end of the year, in spite of constant Western opposition. Moreover, the acquisition of a military nuclear capacity is not unlikely over the next 2 years. Inside Iran, the search for this capacity is considered natural and legitimate, as a guaranty against US/Israeli arsenals and the repeated threats of invasion expressed during the past decades. It is kept as unofficial as the Israeli (now obsolete) nuclear bomb.

The idea that the next elections or the elections after next will dramatically alter this perception, strategy and power position is sheer wishful thinking. Mahmud Ahmadinejad is obviously not a very educated man, considering his poor knowledge of world history, but is neither the author of Iran’s present political vision nor will he be its last defender. No indication whatsoever has been given that Iran would embrace a complete or even a significant reversal of strategy after his fall.

Within this context, the West is right now clearly in a weaker situation than Iran in the Middle–east and Central Eurasia. Granting with condescendence a reintegration into the ‘concert of nations’ will achieve nothing under the circumstance. If anything can be certain in world affairs, no doubt the sudden US need of Iran will but raise all stakes. The opening of talks, the reduction of diplomatic anathema, the reluctant acceptance of Iran’s inevitable civilian nuclear industry and the lifting of ineffective economic sanctions will not be enough to obtain Iran’s passive neutrality. It would additionally take a settlement in Palestine, the only way to contain Iran’s proxies in the South.

Preventing the Persian nuclear bomb, would require an even bolder move. As suggested already in a previous post, only a military denuclearization of the Middle-East and central Asia could offer an alternative attractive enough for Teheran. The concept is not entirely new, but its time may have come. If the US administration is not ready for it, its main rival in this key region will be virtually impossible to contain for quite a long time.

This is how the world goes.