Persian dreams

Is there any limit to how deeply Washington can misunderstand the world? Persia is a showcase for the negative answer. Since the 1953 coup at least, now officially acknowledged as the US operation ‘Ajax’, American foreign policy has been going from one misconception to another: notably, from a candid Carter administration pressuring the Shah into exile and triggering Khomeini’s revolution, to the staggering reinforcement of Iran by the destruction of its nemesis and main regional counter-weight, Iraq. Now, when the US position in the Middle-east would have seemed to reach its nadir, a series of clumsy moves indicate that things could still worsen.

The Obama administration is wise in trying to defuse the explosive situation left by the last presidency. This is not a good reason, however, to play naively in the opponent’s hand. The belief that the mere prospect of entering in Washington’s good grace will move the Iranians to the tears and will be sufficient to get their badly needed assistance or neutrality, looks like the idea of a dreamer or a madman. It is, though, what the DOD seems to have in mind.

NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Bantz J. Craddock just came up with the astonishing idea to ‘allow’ NATO state members to ask Teheran for supply routes into Afghanistan. Why not ask Pyongyang for intelligence support about China? General Craddock avoided requesting personally Iran’s assistance in better invading a neighboring country, and hinted that Germany or France would be welcome to make the first move. After an initial chuckle, Teheran might in fact take the ‘bait’: wouldn’t it be nice to have a say in any further deployment of NATO countries in Afghanistan? After all, the more the Iranians facilitate the switching of troops from Iraq to Afghanistan (at the considered levels which are way too low to bring a real military control), the easier it becomes for them to take over Iraq directly or by proxy. In the event you believe this was a whim from some isolated general, please note that the US Treasury one-sidedly labeled the Kurdish resistance movement against Iran a ‘Terror Organization’ on the next day.

It is difficult to understand why Iran is such a puzzle for the United States. The simple reading of a history book should be enough to make it clear that Persia is used to being a unified super-power (the only one who could resist the Roman empire), with a long patriotic – now nationalistic – tradition, and viewing itself as a matrix of culture. The basic mistake is to see a contradiction between an appetite for modern technologies and the safekeeping of local traditions, including Shiite Islam. Iran is not interested in becoming a part of the Western world, as many Iranians are convinced that US technological superiority is temporary and hides a cultural deficiency. It is therefore perfectly logical to combine an industrial and military modernization, financed by enormous mineral resources, with an effort to promote Shiite values all over the world, starting with the Middle-east and central Asia, the two mains parts of Persia’s courtyard. As long as the curve of American decline –which is seen as inevitable – does not cross Iran’s recovery curve, Teheran can rely on a strategy which has proven its efficiency: war by proxy and martyrdom. This low-cost method was capable of creating chaos at will in Lebanon and in Iraq, leaving Iran as a key-player in both places. It is now applied also with success In Palestine; where Israel is considered by Iran as nothing but a US stronghold. This strategy could be turned anytime against Saudi Arabia and the emirates, once the Palestinian showdown is settled under terms found acceptable by Teheran.

It is now too late to prevent Iran from building up a Mesopotamian hegemony after the departure of US forces. Western presence in Afghanistan does not represent a threat for Iran, as only massive investments (an option now closed by the economic crisis), not additional (and yet insufficient) troops could have made a US success conceivable there.

To complete the picture, the Russian-built nuclear reactor of Bushehr will be operational by the end of the year, in spite of constant Western opposition. Moreover, the acquisition of a military nuclear capacity is not unlikely over the next 2 years. Inside Iran, the search for this capacity is considered natural and legitimate, as a guaranty against US/Israeli arsenals and the repeated threats of invasion expressed during the past decades. It is kept as unofficial as the Israeli (now obsolete) nuclear bomb.

The idea that the next elections or the elections after next will dramatically alter this perception, strategy and power position is sheer wishful thinking. Mahmud Ahmadinejad is obviously not a very educated man, considering his poor knowledge of world history, but is neither the author of Iran’s present political vision nor will he be its last defender. No indication whatsoever has been given that Iran would embrace a complete or even a significant reversal of strategy after his fall.

Within this context, the West is right now clearly in a weaker situation than Iran in the Middle–east and Central Eurasia. Granting with condescendence a reintegration into the ‘concert of nations’ will achieve nothing under the circumstance. If anything can be certain in world affairs, no doubt the sudden US need of Iran will but raise all stakes. The opening of talks, the reduction of diplomatic anathema, the reluctant acceptance of Iran’s inevitable civilian nuclear industry and the lifting of ineffective economic sanctions will not be enough to obtain Iran’s passive neutrality. It would additionally take a settlement in Palestine, the only way to contain Iran’s proxies in the South.

Preventing the Persian nuclear bomb, would require an even bolder move. As suggested already in a previous post, only a military denuclearization of the Middle-East and central Asia could offer an alternative attractive enough for Teheran. The concept is not entirely new, but its time may have come. If the US administration is not ready for it, its main rival in this key region will be virtually impossible to contain for quite a long time.

This is how the world goes.

Rationality vs. Nationalism in the Palestinian conflict – Part II

Public opinion is as strong a force as it can be blind. Sides are usually taken according to the proximity of the respective propaganda sources. Historical rectifications are conceived as aggressions, and self-righteousness reigns on all parts. A rational approach can still be attempted, with limited chances of success. It is however the last resort left for not dying or killing based on utterly wrong reasons. The worst in never certain, after all.

 Let’s start by putting the historical background aside, as it is unable (as we have seen in the previous post) to show us anything else than the extreme relativity of the foundations of all opposing claims. The present issue is not anymore the historical legitimacy of Israel or of a Palestinian State, which is simply dry wood for the flaming ideologies. We should rather consider the rationality and efficiency of the strategies now determining the future of Palestine and Israel.

 The basic objective fact is the following: although at this time militarily unmovable, Israel is facing a lethal danger if the state of war persists indefinitely, because of Israel’s vital dependence on external supports which in turn depend on public opinions that are emotionally inclined to back victims. In an environment where nationalism feeds political analysis with its own notions, when confronted to a conflict between State-haves and State-have-nots, public opinion tends to back the have-nots. Even Congress can abandon a cause it was supposedly ready to die for, when a shift in public opinion starts blowing the whistle of a new electoral tone. Gradually, appalling TV images undermine the most solid positions: South Vietnam, the former ‘bulwark of our liberties’ is long gone and only one example of what it is fact a general rule when you look at it close enough. Many Israeli leaders know it; most Islamic extremists know it too. For this very reason, and sometimes for other motives, most Israeli are aware of the necessity for Israel to make a Palestinian State happen, and most Islamic extremists are convinced they will get one sooner rather than later.

 The issue therefore boils down to the negotiating muscle of the respective parties. The Palestinian strength rests almost exclusively on the public opinion battle, a battle in which Israel has been continuously losing ground since the First Intifada. The weakening of PLO, the war in Lebanon, the building of the wall, the retaliatory incursions into the West Bank, the one-sided withdrawal from the Gaza Strip followed by siege and reinvasion, all carried much more negative consequences than positive ones from the public opinion standpoint, no matter how much sense they might have made for other purposes.

 Symmetrically, the strategy adopted by the Islamic Extremists has recently shown to be much more efficient than the one of the Moderates. It consists in deliberately worsening the situation through aggressive martyrdom: provoking the opponent in order to become a martyr in the eyes of public opinion. Such strategy, the (non-aggressive) roots of which are to be found in the Christian martyrs (who took over the Roman Empire), in the pacifist Indian martyrs (who took the upper hand against the British Empire) or even in the martyrdom of Haile Selassie facing Mussolini, is extremely powerful and should not be underestimated. Triggering a full scale invasion with numerous civilian victims, by launching psychologically dreadful and yet physically almost harmless series of homemade missiles (3 dead at this time), is almost as winning a strategy as having children throw stones at tanks. It is much more efficient than the ill-designed methods of Al-Qaeda (spectacular destruction of civilian targets, and human bombs, especially women or children) which turn to be somewhat counter-productive for the goal pursued by their authors (i.e. the elimination of the United Sates from the Islamic world).

 Countering such a politique du pire cannot be done by simply accusing opponents to be terrorists, criminals, primitive or stupid, even when they are. It can definitely not be done by a sheer repression; hoping to exhaust the opponent’s determination while actually reinforcing it (Please note that Hamas leaders gave themselves the pleasure of initially rejecting the ceasefire in their favor, and asking for more martyrdom). It can only be done by offering terms that public opinion – right or wrong – will consider fair.

 The core of such terms has been known for a while, and it is probably a mistake to keep them under the table in order only to hopefully maintain one’s bargaining position. To be viable, the future Palestinian state must be territorially unified, have a critical size and the capacity to economically and socially absorb the refuges under decent conditions. It must be exempt from enclaves justifying major claims. Territorially, this implies not only the restitution of almost all Occupied Territories, but also some concession on the status of Jerusalem. A delicate issue seems to be the Right of Return, yet more apparent than real: the combination of a moratory with a viable Palestinian State should logically lead a majority of former refugees to waive it. Palestinian concessions will be essentially limited to the formal acceptance of the negotiated borders and the actual banning of terrorist activities, under the control and assistance of an adapted International police force.

 It is likely that the next Israeli government and the new US administration will give it a try to a certain degree, the main problem being to find counterparts to negotiate with, in the absence of a strong moderate Palestinian leadership. As it is neither in the Hamas nor in its Iranian backer’s immediate interest to pursue a rapid peace which would reduce considerably their role and influence, the only sound option for Israel is to create the conditions for a political comeback of the Fatah. This could hardly be achieved in the absence of an intermediary phase during which the extend of the territorial concessions that are being considered is publicized, the settlements are methodically dismantled, response to attacks while remaining firm is restrained and targeted from a distance, the daily life of Arab Israeli and Palestinian workers in Israel – an important link – is proactively improved, and the reelection of the few Arab Israeli MPs facilitated.

 This is of course faster said than done. At least this sets a reasonable course of action, foreign to ideologies and partisanship. The coming elections in Israel and the visible aspiration of the new US administration to get out of the hornet’s nest give it at least some minimal possibility.

 At some point, for peace to eventually take place the Iranian pressure will have to be released. I doubt mere ‘conversations’ will do the job, unless a trump is put on the table. The only pacific one I could see is the prospect of an International conference on the global denuclearization of the Middle-east, which is no not entirely impossible as a good way to temper the region.

 If none of this happens, if no real attempt is made to enact a reasonable plan prepared by intermediary phase, Israel will survive but its situation will continue to degrade. Both local populations will continue to undergo unsafety or misery and extremists will thrive.

 I am not sure bookmakers would bet on a rational development rather than an intensification of nationalism. Yet, who knows?

  

 

 

Rationality vs. Nationalism in the Palestinian conflict – Part I

Few topics are subject to more irrational partisanship than the Palestinian conflict. Any discussion of historical claims or legitimacy issues is a sure way to reach a quick dead-end, the particular complexity of the regional history being buried under a thick layer of ideological beliefs and errors. Here is a quick reminder.

 The very name Palestine was given by Emperor Hadrian to his province of Judea, as a punitive symbol after the bar Kochba revolt. He also simultaneously renamed Jerusalem Aelia Capitolina and banned the Judeans inhabitants from the city. Palestinia was a transposition of a word used by Herodotus for the land of the Philistines, these descendants of the People of the Sea (including the Phoenicians), a mixture of Indo-European populations having invaded the so-called ‘Asian’ territories of Egypt during the 12^th century BCE. The renaming was nothing but an expression of the Roman aggravation in front of the obstinate refusal of the Judean Bedouins to integrate the Empire: at the time of Hadrian, very little was actually left from the former Philistines in Judea, except a small presence around Gaza.

 For most of its long history the territory today known as Palestine (corresponding more or less to the southern part of the Roman province of Judea Palestinia) was subject to a series of realms and (mostly) empires: including but not limited to Cannaites/ Phoenicians, Egyptians, Hittites, Hebrews, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Franks, Mongols, Turks and British.

 As to the Hebrews, they dominated the area as a group of beduinic tribes over the 11^th century BCE. A short-lived unified kingdom lasted for about one century until the death of Salomon (-933). It was then divided into a Kingdom of Israel in the North (10 tribes) and a more destitute kingdom of Judah in the South (2 tribes). In -733 the Kingdom of Israel was thoroughly annihilated by the Assyrians. In -586 the Kingdom of Judah was in turn destroyed by the Babylonians and its modest population deported to Iran (soon to be called Persia).

 The Persians rebuilt Judea as a buffer state against Egypt, reintroducing part of the Hebrews in the area and rebuilding their temple in Jerusalem. When Alexander conquered Persia, a significant part of the local population was sent to the new city of Alexandria. Judea remained a Greek dominion until the Romans took over.

 Following their preference for indirect rule, the Romans allowed the creation of a Judean client-state under a Jewish (new name for the Hebrews) dynasty, the Hasmoneans (-138), replaced in -37 by the mixted (Greco-Edomite-Nabatean-Jewish) Herodian dynasty. A succession of revolts, mainly in 66-73 and 132-135, ended in direct Roman rule followed by the exile of most of the remaining Jewish population.

 Beduinic armies coming from the Arabian Peninsula conquered the region in 637, defeating both the Persians and the Romans (now the Byzantines), and converting most of the population to Islam. Palestine was thereafter placed under the domination of a succession of Islamic empires almost never run by Arabs but by a mixture of Turco-mongols or even European conquerors or slaves, until the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire after WWI.

 In 1881, before the arrivals of the firsts Zionist migrants, the population in Palestine was limited to 457.000 souls (400.000 Muslims, 40.000 Orthodox Christians and 17.000 Jews). As the Arabian conquest did not take the form of a migration, it is reasonable to believe that a significant part of the Muslim population of Palestine was then formed by descendants of the Roman Jews converted to Islam.

 The recent part of the story is the direct consequence of the rise of Nationalisms, from the mid 19^th century on. Nationalism, a French creation, is the invention of mythical common origins in order for a culturally or geographically connected group to claim a right of absolute sovereignty over a territory. Please recall that the Normans and Britons were Vikings, French monarchs Germans, Provence Roman, then Germanic, then Arabic, before integrating the German empire of Charlemagne, that Burgundy was German and Spanish, that Picardie was annexed by Louis XIV, and that Savoy and Nice joined France 20 years after Senegal. The unification of 200 German speaking principalities, in spite of their deep religious divisions, under Prussia (a State artificially created during the Crusades), was a response to French imperialism. The historical existence of a ‘German nation’, however, rested on even weaker grounds than the one of a ‘French nation’.

 A Jewish nationalism was soon to follow, first as an intellectual reaction against these evolutions, then as a practical escape from their dire consequences. A vast majority of the European followers of the Jewish religion were settled inside the Russian empire. Some were certainly actual descendants of the exiled Hebrews; many others were the descendants of Turkic populations converted to Judaism over time (such as the Khazars). Some were preserving their ethnic idiosyncrasies; others were assimilating into the dominant Christian fabric.

 The pogroms which had followed the assassination of Czar Alexander II, as well as the Dreyfus affair in France, triggered a sudden growth of Jewish nationalism. In spite of its shaky foundations, the idea was then accepted that all the Jews in the world (then speaking in excess of 130 different languages, and having very distinct ethnic characters and genetic origins, including Yemenites and north-African Berbers among several others) were nothing but the very same Hebrews that had been dispersed by the Persians and the Romans. About ¼ migrated to America and British dominions, ½ were exterminated by the Germans, and a good part of the remaining ¼ took step by step the road to Palestine.

 Last but certainly not least of all, the Arab nationalism had taken birth out of the decaying corpse of the Ottoman Empire. Populations who had little in common, except a language (more or less) and a religion started feeling a common origin and a common destiny. Their new origin was of course as mythological as in all other nationalisms, and their common destiny an illusion. Various ‘nationalisms’ were attempted by trial and errors: from Arab at large, to Palestinian, via Syrian, etc. At the end of the day, no actual ‘Arab’ nation took birth, and – except in Egypt- the nationalisms adopted the artificial divisions introduced by the British Empire and secondarily by France.

 Only one area of the former Ottoman Empire, Palestine, could not be filled by an Arabic state, as the Zionist migration first and then the creation of the state of Israel made it impossible. Both Arabs and Israeli refused to even imagine a common state. The question then became: would the Arab-speaking populations of Palestine be the only ones without a State reflecting their nationalistic aspirations? Both Jordan and Lebanon had by then acquired enough identity to prevent their territories from turning into a solution for the missing Palestinian element. Backed by the United States of America, Israel was now militarily invincible and could not be removed. Fueled by an anti-American sentiment, most Arab states (and later the Islamic Iran) funded the terrorist turn of the Arabic resistance in Palestine.

 While the nationalist ideology was reaching a climax both among the Jewish Israelis and the Muslim Palestinians, the most powerful force in contemporary politics – public opinion – was called to take sides.

 (to be continued)

Back to the Future

In 1992, a very famous book announced the End of History. For the better or for the worse, current events may be pulling us back to the future, i.e. to change under incertitude, the old feature of human condition. One of the foremost economic crises in modern times is not only blurring the vision of a triumphant capitalist market, but is also reopening the possibility of a political eschatology somewhat different from the everlasting parliamentary State.

While governments minimize by a full order of magnitude the quantities of financial medicine they should inject into the arteries of a chocking world trade, entire populations get closer everyday from feeling personally the pains of new poverty. The higher the recent growth their respective countries had reached, the harsher the depression will be for them. The most dependent zones on foreign trade are likely to undergo a severe social turmoil. For once, Western Europe is not the weakest link. Equipped with the strongest social infrastructures and relatively good reserves, the area is also protected by its dominant inner trade, as well as a long habit of bad news and of lagging in economic growth. “Chinamerica” should be the seismic zone, together with Eastern Europe. The United States cannot solve all issues by simply playing with an overwhelming currency, as in the good old days, and the Chinese armed forces are not strong enough to fight a violent resentment against so great lost expectations.

What’s really new is that domination of the State is not as much at stake as the State itself. We are not confronted with the prospect of opposition parties taking over, but with the one of a pervasive distrust for States in general. Tax boycotts could very well appear in America, and riots in many places. Young people raised in false hopes will show their anger. Nihilistic sabotage, rejection of intellectual property may also join the symptoms. Such disorders, not being driven by a structured vision of society, are among the most difficult to fight by anything else than extreme ideologies. Even Islam may prove unable to capture a negative energy essentially indifferent to geopolitics.

You may smile at this kind of doom saying and you may be right in only one case: if we can rebuild the system nearly as fast as we destroyed it, if the economy can take a fresh start on the basis of a fraction only of the assets which were annihilated. If you do not believe this is a real possibility, then better get ready to meet History again.

Bertolt Brecht had a say for the optimist and one for the pessimist. You can now make your choice: ‘The worst is never certain’ and ‘The belly is still fertile from which the foul beast sprang’. Personally, I would pick both.

This is how the world goes.

How will the world look like when the shock wave hits?

It has been fashionable for some time now to distinguish between ‘finance’ and the ‘real economy’. This is not very sound as finance is nothing but the cardiovascular system of the economy (made of goods and other services). The heart is now in surgery room, surrounded by physicians with limited knowledge and – above all – limited means. All they know is not to repeat the same mistake that was made in 1929, which consisted in adding a liquidity crisis to a stock market crash, and putting the overall activity close to a standstill. Governments and central banks are now pouring all the cash they have and soon all the cash they don’t into the failing arteries, in order to keep liquidity at a par with the massive destruction of wealth which is now occurring on stock markets. They definitely try their very best to save the banking system from complete crumble, by guarantying and nationalizing one after the other major financial institutions. Even after their current reserves are gone, they should be able to continue doing this by using their status of ‘least bad’ borrowers: sovereign obligations (close to having null interests’ rates) shall allow them to pursue this exercise for a while.

There is however a quantitative limit to the number and scope of entities they can bail out. Financial institutions are one important thing, and yet not the only components of the financial system. Corporations, pension funds, high net worth individuals are also facing almost unprecedented financial losses. Even massive tax cuts cannot compensate such losses (tax cuts are more or less automatically granted as losses are not supposed to be taxed in any case). For the economy to work, corporations and high net worth individuals must invest and pay salaries, while pension funds must pay pensions to consumers. Globally, they will not be able to do it at previous levels for a long while. And this is precisely how the shock waves hit the rest of the economy.

At this point, even if both causes and treatments are different from what they were in the 1930s, the phenomenology of the crisis shall look pretty much the same: massive plunge in the price of assets, massive unemployment, and massive physical poverty. As during the 30s, there will be some winners too: these are basically the owners of cash, now able to purchase the massively discounted assets as they come, provided however their cash is in safe currencies placed in a safety deposit boxes or nationalized banks. Opportunities, as a matter of fact, should multiply for them when the stock market goes down to 25-30% of its peak values, and real estate (or contemporary art) 50 to 20%. The problem is obviously that most people and corporations not only have little cash but are carrying heavy debts. Leveraged assets (many exist in the private equity sector) should go bust, and consumers’ markets will violently contract, fueling the vicious circle of recession. This should happen even if the CDS shock wave does not hit (see previous posts). If it does, you’ll see your attorney offer to work for food, and fascism come back.

Many people do not realize this. As few of them were directly exposed to the stock market, they are happy to see the ‘traders’ and the rich in general pay the price of their own mistakes, and believe they won’t have to pick the tab also, while governments are finding a solution. How wrong. They should start discovering the ugly truth sometime in 2009, and feel the consequences for a while (5 or 20 years?) afterwards.

How will the final relief come? As usual instant experts will promote gigantic schemes involving new ‘Bretton Woods’ (to achieve what as this is not a monetary crisis?) and ‘Marshall Plans’ (how can this be done in the absence of the equivalent of the 1945 USA?). As usual also, the military will attempt to be the new trusted economists, pointing at strategic hotpots (Iran, Taiwan) and lurking at weaker countries were money is left.

Let’s hope Obama can resist and someone comes up with better ideas.

This is how the world goes (sorry about that)

Don’t bother to be pessimistic: things are much worse than you may think

Remember my last post on the Credit Default Swaps? Dubai just obtained a 15 billion $ bailout from Abu Dhabi to face a default of their own Credit Default swaps. Dubai…

Let’s look again at the issue. The outstanding amount of subprime debt is about of 1,300 billion $. The outstanding amount of CDS is about 50 times larger. The good news is that a large part of this amount is made of offset positions by players reducing their exposure or netting their own contracts. As it is currently impossible to know the net total amount of outstanding CDS, let’s make the most unrealistically optimistic assumption, and consider 90% of the positions as offsets. The bad news is we are still left with at least 5 times the total amount of subprime debt.

Another element to be taken into consideration is that subprime debt is somehow based on real assets: even if they are worth a fraction only of their nominal value, buildings and apartments are still worth something. This is not at all the case with credit default swaps which are based on nothing else than gambling, a very special case of gambling, indeed. Casino gambling is regulated, CDS are not. Casinos have money to pay their own losses; this is not the case with CDS issuers. Casino’s risks are stable; CDS’s risks are not. Quite the opposite in fact: Credit Default Swaps are bets on the credit quality of third parties, at a time when the credit quality of all institutions in the world (including governments) is crumbling down under the effect of the financial crisis. Therefore most (net) CDS are doomed.

Just as the explosion of an H-bomb is initiated by the explosion of an A-bomb, the subprime crisis is getting ready to trigger the CDS crisis.

How many crises are we dealing with? Let’s count. 1 is the end of cycle which started last year and was accelerated by the surge in the price of commodities. 1 was strong enough to entail a recession that the general public would have started feeling in any case by the end of 2008. 2 is the subprime loans crisis, which already turned out to be big enough to shake the world banking system. 3 is the CDS crisis which has not started yet but looks inevitable, considering the combination of 1 and 2. 3 is definitely capable of destroying a large part of the global financial system. 4 is the subsequent mega recession which should logically follow, with major expected unemployment levels and market crunches.

Oh my, enough for today (to be continued though if you can still face it)

This is how the world goes.

A pyrrhic victory in Georgia?

The ancient art of managing empires did not enter the 21st century without a need for amendments. The use of brutal force against foreign countries and the sheer violation of international treaties in order to simply consolidate one’s territories and sphere of influence are not stopped. They tend however to meet massive opposition and trigger worldwide pressure. Even hegemony, this mild form of imperialism invented by the Athenians, which consists in abusing quietly one’s leadership in an alliance to roll-out a one-sided agenda, is not as easily implemented as it used to be.

Obviously, any careless aggression of the strong by the weak, based on blatant miscalculations, particularly by military means, remains a very bad idea, as the misguided president of Georgia just experienced. The lesson goes far beyond geopolitics: in about any field of activity, a kitty cat should always think twice before eating the tiger’s prey. It was natural for a hyper-nationalistic and humiliated Russia to seize the occasion to show some muscle.

This irresistible move does not imply, however, that Russia is again in a position to restore its crumbling empire. On the contrary, it may have unwillingly initiated a new bad streak for its imperialistic play. Externally, the surrounding countries released from the ‘Prison of Nations’ by the fall of Soviet Union, are now fully warned of the precarious nature of their independence, while NATO is left with no other choice than shielding them by accelerating their integration, or taking the chance to lose them again any day. Internally, several of the hundreds of non-Russian nations covering both the Caucasus and all territories East of Ural, can now hope to benefit one day from the same unilateral recognition by the West that Moscow just granted to South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

The notion of “powerlessness’ can become quite tricky. In the same way that NATO was powerless against what happened, Moscow would be just as powerless against what could happen to its vital interests, if secessionist claims were now refueled in the entire region. In the same way that NATO could not prevent Russian troops to penetrate Georgia, Russia could not prevent Western fleets from locking up the Black Sea. As Russia can certainly not afford any isolation these days, the military stalemate which was playing its favor after WWII, now allows the West to slowly but surely undermine the last of modern empires.

This is how the world goes.

A solution to the oil crisis?

The most serious dangers come unannounced and generals are not the only ones to prepare for the last war. We became aware of the depletion of oil& gas resources and now start panicking at the very time an exit solution is at hand.

No matter what the primary source of energy is (hydrocarbons, biomass, nuclear, solar, geothermal, aeolian or hydraulic), electricity is a universal carrier, as any primary source of energy can be transformed into electric current. Electromechanical heat engines or kinetic energy directly activate turbines which in turn produce electricity ready for distribution.

The only limit to existing centralized or semi-centralized electric distribution grids is a lack of portability, excluding most mobile engines, with the notable exception of railways. Until very recently the weight and inefficiency of batteries was such that the additional energy needed to simply transport them, made electricity impractical for most vehicles.

The situation has changed. A combination of major improvements in the technology of batteries and a bright and simple idea are placing us on the eve of a major energy revolution. By 2011 the automotive industry will put on the market not prototypes but mass series of electric cars with an average autonomy of about 150 miles, a threshold for convenient urban use. A larger autonomy is of course required for a full substitution of thermal engines, considering in particular the time it takes to recharge a battery. This is where the bright and simple idea comes into the picture. Just as Formula1 cars can be refueled in a matter of seconds, car batteries can be instantly replaced at will. Using the existing network of gas stations, extended to other kinds of outlets, car batteries will be recharged from the power grid, allowing subscribing drivers to exchange their empty battery against a charged one for a fee, with no waiting time. The system is being experimented by Total in Israel as we speak. No doubt it will be a tremendous success, leaving only aircrafts and boats (partially) to the old hydrocarbons system… until the next generation of batteries comes up.

Technically, substituting most of the existing installed base of mobile thermal engines can be done in a decade, and this is the kind of good news both the world economy and the environment were badly waiting for. Extending the substitution to coal-supplied plants is nothing but a matter of political opportunity, as it is both easy and tempting for certain countries to tax ‘dirty’ imports, made from polluting energies together with other negative factors (e.g. slave work). Heating is likely to be the last element to be aligned with the new system, and the price of fossil energies mostly will decide of the pace for this sector.

While these events are taking place, the skyrocketing price of oil & gas is generating a new cycle in exploration. This means that as the use of petroleum products decreases the amount of reserves will increase in possibly unprecedented proportions. For instance, it has been know since the 70’s (before the first oil crisis) that the Western Mediterranean basin, having been depleted 150.000 years ago, is covered with a thick layer of salt, which is not unlikely to hide among the largest fields of fossil energy on earth. Exploration (now possible at such depth) should soon start in Marseille and Cyprus. If successful, the oil & gas markets are doomed even sooner than the above mentioned revolution would have entailed by itself.

A zero oil economy, therefore, with local exceptions in the poorest countries (then unwillingly limited to using ‘cheap’ oil!), far from belonging to science fiction or utopia, is a good prospect for the middle of this century. Obviously, the question of the primary energies remains open. Most large resources have a limit or a downside. Nuclear energy is dangerous, coal and biomass extremely polluting; and other energies still insufficiently efficient. Nuclear energy, however, is the only one which can sustain the new energy system on a massive scale, until technological innovation allows its potential elimination. Reserves are not a problem at this stage. The proven reserves of uranium can cover 60 years of the current needs. The limited proportion of mineral costs in nuclear energy (about 5% of total costs) makes exploration (today almost at a stop) financially easy. Above all, a new generation of so-called ‘rapid neutrons reactors’ exploiting the plutonium produced by the very transformation process occurring in reactors, should soon increase by a factor 50 to 100 the efficiency of Uranium 238 (which represents 99.3% of the reserves). Nuclear energy can therefore offer a constant fallback position, as long as it takes to make non-polluting renewable energies, e.g. solar and tidal, efficient enough to become the main sources of primary energy for the electric power grid.

The laughable paradox in all this is that crumbling petroleum markets could become be the main factor of slowdown in the change, postponing somewhat the major economic benefits of the energy revolution to come (new technologies, new products, new markets, new investments, reduced financial and environmental costs). The other factor is more simply political. How long will it take for Europe, Japan and other countries to force the US (where 49% of electricity generation comes from burning coal) as well as China to drastically reduce their consumption of highly polluting coal, through new treaties against global warming and import taxes? Some time indeed.

This is how the world goes.

Capitalodespotism in Chinamerica and other places

Capitalism likes Free Market up to a certain point, i.e. as long as it means not to be hindered from selling and buying any quantity of merchandise. Capitalism, however, starts disliking Free Market when it allows foreign products to do better than your own and manpower to increase its costs, or when it prevents the governments under your influence to grant you subsidies and de facto monopolies, or to negotiate for you some privilege abroad.

The ne plus ultra is a combination of Free Market and Despotism, a good model of which is now in place in Chinamerica, a chimera which should stay alive as long as the two economies can complement each other. In order to do so, the West must keep the most advanced technologies, while the East keeps sheltering the cheapest mass production system. The West must continue to shift its intermediary productions to the East, while retaining most of the profit margins as a payment for its own technologies. In exchange, the East benefits from massive investments, becomes a dominant exporter, and grows at a rapid pace.

Despotism plays here a double role. Totalitarianism – a direct legacy of the Communist system – is used to control the cost of manpower and reduce sovereign risks in the East, while covert public subsidies and militarization allow the West to maintain its vital technological edge.

Unfortunately for its beneficiaries, such a synergy cannot last forever: a) Western governments are unable to justify their hidden support to totalitarianism, a system absolutely opposed to their own public opinion’s ideology. The Olympic flame crisis is nothing but an example of this difficulty. b) Transfers of production entail transfers of technology; while at the same time a constant increase of wealth in the East allows a gradual build up of an autonomous technological capacity. At some point the two poles are therefore bound to compete on the same technologies, losing their complementarities. c) Shifting production in the East also implies growing unemployment in the West, reducing in relative terms the size of Western markets and increasing social costs and pressures in the West. This reduction cannot be fully compensated in the East by the growth of its inner market, exports representing too large a share of the national income.

For the battle to come, the West is at first sight better placed than China, as India represents an excellent substitute for cheap mast production with less ideological downsides. A political liberalization of China is a very difficult exercise, never attempted to this day. Economic growth being a strong factor leading to it, the immediate outcome is likely to be a new surge of despotism and repression, making it very difficult for the West to keep a harmonious relationship with China, and fostering the shift to India.

On the longer run, however, the West is likely to lose the economic war, for lack of innovation. Mechanical engineering and electronics are already behind. Its advance in both computing, telecommunications, energy technologies is soon to be reduced to nothing. Its financial techniques are currently undergoing a fatal blow. Biotechs and materials are lagging. The absence of both large-scale military opponents and financial reserves of governments limits the prospects of military funding of R&D. The cost of manpower in developed countries has seriously weakened their agriculture. Remain the consumers’ brands. How long will it take before there are taken over by the actual producers?

If and when this happens, a new poverty in the West will call for a new despotism.

This is how the world goes.

Tibet and Game theory

During its long history China never was an expansionist power and yet never abandoned lightly any inch of gained territory.  The notion of Yellow Peril originates in the Mongols, the most expansionist people in the history of mankind, not in the Chinese. The common absorption of China and Tibet by the Gengiskhanids, in the 14^th century, put an end to their old rivalry. Since that time, Tibet has always been considered somehow as a Chinese protectorate. Even though most Tibetans would certainly prefer to regain their independence, the protectorate is at least de facto accepted by both the Dalaï Lama and the international community. A Tibetan war of Independence would mean nothing else than a war between India and China, a most unrealistic prospect. The only thing at stake for Tibet is therefore a possible return to home rule within Chinese borders. Can this happen?

Humiliating China over the Olympic Games can achieve little. Chinese nationalism would be exacerbated to no avail. On the other hand, the international community is not prevented from stating that the Chinese presence in Tibet is acceptable if and only if the cultural and legal internal autonomy of Tibet is achieved. Should this stance be adopted simultaneously by the United States, Japan, India and the three main European countries, not precluding discrete and yet firm prospects of commercial sanctions, this strategy would have a limited but real chance of success. Its current trade balance makes China ultra sensitive to such pressures.

However, would the International community be willing to keep a united front that China should try to break by using Game theory and extending here and there commercial favors? Odds are high that any single player having a greater advantage in betraying the group than in obtaining a collective advantage, will indeed betray the group.

This is how the world goes.

Cassandra’s principle (Part 1)

A law of incertitude applies to political events: if they could be forecast, most could be prevented from happening, therefore most forecasts would be proven wrong. If anyone can predict political events, he is a Cassandra no one believes or listens to. One can nevertheless get a feeling on how things are going. The main question is whether we are in stable environment, i.e. one in which few events have a high probability to upset the present overall situation, or in an environment close to chaos and full of crossroads, i.e. one in which anyone of a large range of possible local events can trigger dramatic changes.

Obviously, no period of history is either completely stable or chaotic (total anarchy almost never happens), but some are shakier than others. It would seem to me that we have entered an age of particular fragility, in some ways similar to the first decade of the 20th century. From an optimistic point of view, things look rather good. The great confrontation between East and West, Communism and Democracies, Soviet Union and the USA, which had been very close to terminate mankind (all direct actors now admit that the Cuban missiles crisis had put during three days the world’s future at the mercy of a dice roll), is now over. The globalization of the economy has opened gigantic markets made of billions of new consumers, while massive transfers of technology have allowed these populations to acquire solvability. The parliamentary regime is an accepted model, at least as a matter of principle. In real terms, production has reached a point where starvation is not far from being under control. Global public health is gradually improving.

On the other hand, several lines of fractures can be noted. Nuclear proliferation is the most visible danger, especially in connection with the Middle-East, a zone of extreme instability and major implications for all strategic interests in the world. Both Israel and Pakistan are nuclear powers; Iran is actively trying to become one; Several NATO countries and Russia are located in the immediate neighborhood; the U.S. have concentrated most of their troops in the region, a majority of which are already in a situation of combat. Organized liberation forces are willing and financially capable of acquiring nuclear substances usable as ‘dirty bombs’, and perhaps ‘lost’ tactic missiles from the former Soviet Union. Iran and the Hezbollah have emphasized their stance of refusal of the Israel’s existence. Israel in turn is now a fortress, physically surrounded by a wall, threatened by a new generation of Palestinians born and raised in refugee camps outside the wall, or humiliated by the intense security controls they are subject to inside the wall. This population, which could not be integrated in either Lebanon or Jordan, and which is being denied an actual ‘right of return’ by all peace agreements that have been contemplated, receives a strong ideological backing from a Muslim world composed of 1.2 billion individuals, including most surrounding governments. Deprived of classical military forces, Palestinians can only oppose their enemy by civilian disobedience or rebellion, as well as terrorist attacks which have become a standard mode of action. Such attacks are renewed, in a vicious circle, by the inevitable repression following each of them. No Israeli administration would ever consider a withdrawal, and if the country was to be placed in a situation of ultimate danger, the chance of nuclear weapons being used can be estimated as high. The vital assistance Israel is receiving from the U.S. is an additional motive for alienating neighboring populations and governments who tend to view the Jewish state as a colonial instrument in the hands of the Superpower. The US, having vainly attempted to dissuade opposition to their views by conquering altogether Iraq, one of the major local powers, and threatening both Syria and Iran of extending military actions to their territories, are now suffering from a drastic credibility decrease. Failure to control the civil war in Iraq or Afghanistan, as well as a confusion between the notion of ‘peace process’ and the mere enforcement of their own immediate interests, are preventing them from stabilizing the area. Iran finds itself reinforced by prospects of either a formal or an informal partition of Iraq, thanks to strong ties with the Shiite majority. Pakistan, a key player, is entering a new phase of incertitude. Pressured for years by the US for a better assistance in the Afghanistan conflict and elimination of Al Quaeda, General Musharaff had to accentuate the dictatorial aspects of his regime, and is now on the verge of being ousted. Even if he his replaced in the short-term by new leaders agreeable to the West, history has shown that such evolutions can take an unpredictable turn, as the exile of the Shah demonstrated in Iran against all the Carter administration’s plans. A nuclear Pakistan eventually falling in radical Islamist hands would probably mean a catastrophic change for Western interests. Waves would be likely to reach the shores of Saudi Arabia and other fragile monarchies hosting critical reserves of mineral energy.

Even if the Middle East was the only zone of strategic concern, and even putting aside long term (but serious) climatic risks, other lines of fracture must also be taken into consideration

(To be continued)

How smart are the cynics?

Political cynics are people who support or implement some ‘dirty work’ in order to protect their own personal or national interests. They view themselves as smarter than people who simply think their best interest is to promote the goals they believe in, using means that do not contradict the very goal. The cynics call themselves realists and practical minds. They call their opponents idealists and dreamers.

Realpolitics is to deal with other people as they are, not as they should be. Even idealists can accept to interact with their enemies, and compromise on certain points to obtain more important ones. Cynics seldom compromise with anyone who does not share their views, with the exception of pawns whom they think they can manipulate. Their nature is to adopt the same methods they condemn in others, and fight anyone different from what they would themselves like to be (and are not). Starting from such illogical principles, they tend to come up with schemes generally too complex to be successfully implemented, entailing incontrollable implications. Cynics, as a matter of fact, are the ones who back dictatorship to protect democracy or reduce civil liberties to warrant them, attack weak countries to threaten powerful ones, torture advocates just as well as opponents of free speech, bomb civilian populations to deter terrorists, or take any such inconsistent course of action.

Cynics are extremely inefficient. They engage in covert operations, overlooking the fact that they almost always end up in being publicized. They back political regimes contrary to what they would like for themselves, blurring their own image, and alienating therefore masses of potential supporters. They spend vastly more in attempting to control resources than in simply purchasing them, or in plotting against the nationalization of a company than in accepting a reduction of its expected profits. They start wars they rarely win and cannot end. Too confident is the absence of limits of what they are ready to do, they bet on total victory in such a way that humiliation inevitably follows any reversal of fortune .

Absence of scruples is not enough to make a political cynic. It also takes a complete misunderstanding of social dynamics, as well as a rare degree of historical ignorance. Al Capone never became the richest man in America, Adolph Hitler’s death was not full of glory, and most dictators end up executed, assassinated or in exile. Gandhi and Mandela, sticking to means compatible with their own goals, and proclaiming their actual intentions directly, were much more successful. As always, really smart people are scarce. They prefer simplicity to complications, plain truth to tangled lies. Being aware of the incertitude of events, they contemplate failure as a permanent possibility, and take steps that have a value in themselves, each one of them still making sense even if it was to be the last one. They also are the only ones capable of turning their opponents into followers, by the force of example.

The cynics, a widespread species, do not belong to a specific place or ideology. They survive not because they achieve anything, but only because there are so many of them that there is plenty of supply to replace those who fail. By the laws of randomness, some can still get lucky.

This is how the world goes.

Dealing with socialist leaders in Latin America

Of the three main diplomatic issues the future administration in Washington will be confronted to, one can be considered as more easily manageable than the others, i.e. the relationship with socialist leaders in Latin America. It is disconnected from the intricacies of the Middle Eastern situation, and free from direct involvement of foreign powers.

This was not always the case. Until the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, Latin America had been a major field of confrontation between East and West. The following decade was the time of an illusion for the U.S., then contemplating the prospects of unbound hyper-power. Concerns were limited to minor local conflicts, and the strategy was to focus on imposing the Washington consensus (also dated 1989) to the global economy, including obviously South and Central America. The possibility to enforce unopposed both the Monroe doctrine and the Washington consensus led to pursue a policy of eradication of socialism in Latin America. Masterminds of covert and clandestine operations went unleashed. The debt crisis of the 1980s (when banks had been losing almost overnight in the region a century of profits) was forgotten. Military dictatorships received full support.

After 2001came the discovery that hyper-power has limits. No matter how many troops, how much money, how many restrictions to civil liberties, how much acceptance of the deterioration of one’s public image, the best that could be achieved, even in the absence of any strategic rival, was the abduction and execution of an obnoxious leader in a weak country. Almost everyone came to understand that time had come for revised foreign policies.

Unfortunately, instead of considering the easiest problem at hand (Latin America), the attention remained focused on the most difficult one (Iraq and the Middle-East). Escaping the mud pit in Iraq will be almost as tricky as calming down the hornet’s nest in Palestine. Things can certainly be put on a better track. No free ride can yet be expected. The more, however, Washington will pull back from the East, the more important dealing with issues in the West will become.

Discussing a strategy for Latin America should not remain a parlor conversation, and should move up in the priority list, even though socialism in Latin America certainly does not attract masses of supporters in Washington. Introducing the topic in the presidential campaign would even be a dangerous move: who, other than a radical or a wimp, could even think of softening the hard-line? On the other hand, Latin America can become a problem.

The danger does not come from governments. Putting propaganda aside, any one who does not get his primary information from TV, knows that Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, Raul Castro, Alan Garcia, Daniel Ortega, and of course Lula da Silva, Tabaré Vasquez or Michelle Bachelet, are no threat at all for the security of the United States. The danger is more in the fact that – except the Castros who are a legacy from the past – all of them have been democratically elected, in spite of powerful opponents strongly backed from the North. Even Chavez was able to lose a referendum (not something that would happen frequently in a regular dictatorship). He had previously managed to be reinstated after a coup attempt supported by the local media. This means that the majority of the population of the entire subcontinent has now shifted to left-wing opinions, an evolution not to be taken lightly, and which cannot be countered anymore by series of military coups like during the good old days. The reasons for this are well-known: extreme poverty, extreme inequalities, resentment against right-wing authoritarian regimes, discredit of the U.S. administration.

None of these leaders obviously intends to serve the U.S. economic interests and it may be unpleasant to see Chavez pressuring ExxonMobile Corp. for more tax income, unpleasant and yet certainly not tragic. Not only the amounts at stake are limited, but the motivations are also understandable. Let’s try a thought experiment: let’s imagine that Venezuela is by far the largest economic and military power in the world or that Bolivian oil companies are the biggest, while extreme poverty and unemployment is dominant in the North, a handful of billionaires close to Caracas pushing for always more international control over U.S. companies. Who in Washington would not be tempted by reclaiming part of the oil fields in Texas, and preventing some Bolivian TV network based in D.C. from pouring its propaganda all over the country? Not even going as far as imagining Nicaraguan covert operations in Virginia, the whole thing sounds like a joke or madness. It nevertheless reflects a widely spread feeling down there.

There are only two ways to go about it. One is ” too bad, tough life, that’s how things are, in any case this could not happen as socialism cannot build strong companies (what about Gazprom?), so let’s continue as before”. The other way is to compromise in order to avoid further radicalization, as well as a possible connection with other sources of radicalism elsewhere. One can be a believer in the virtues of free market economy and still understand than certain situations, such as the one which justified the New Deal, require a modified treatment. Persistent extreme poverty and growing inequalities in Latin America are a long term problem which can only made worse by short-sighted views.

Normalizing the relations with socialist leaders is a two-way street. In all fairness, there is a double cost attached to it: ideological, as the Washington consensus may have to be softened down; and financial, as one would have to allow theses countries to reclaim some of their national resources. In exchange, a consolidation of Latin America (including Cuba) as a safe strategic area may be obtained, together with an much improved image of the U.S. in the world, a weakening of purely revolutionary movements, and a reduction in sovereign risks.

Unfortunately manly hardliners often look better than long-term and more pacific strategists. Brutal thinking is an all-time bestseller.

This is how the world goes.

Czar and Emir

Russia is now the last great colonial power in the world, ruling over 160 ethnic groups speaking 100 languages, on a vast territory (the largest in the world). Three quarters of its surface is located east of the Urals, i.e. outside the metropolitan part of the empire.

Russia’s economy (smaller than Brazil’s) is predominantly based on the exploitation of natural resources inside its colonial domain: commodities, raw materials, agricultural inputs. Oil & Gas by themselves account for about 30% of the total tax revenues. At 10 to 15 dollar per barrel, the second largest producer of crude oil after Saudi Arabia was a former communist country; at $100 it turns into an Emirate.

Russia is a somewhat unusual emirate, being governed by an elected Czar chosen by the KGB aristocracy. It is not a particularly efficient one, with a GDP growing by 5 to 8% a year, while the price of commodities was multiplied about 4 times over a period of ten years.

As most emirates, Russia is also bound to be conservative in foreign policy. Soviet Union was backing every movement of independence. Russia is not. The main goals it can now achieve are formal respect for its national pride and be left alone in Chechnya.

More awkward than anything for an emirate, Russia is not a friend of Islam. Afghanistan is the name of its worst humiliation, more painful perhaps than the loss of Central Europe. Muslims are the only potential danger for the internal peace of the realm. Orthodox Russia is thus coming back with a vengeance. Hence the significance of Serbia, and the hostility to Kosovo’s independence, a multiple blow to the new Russian values.

Can the Kremlin do much about it? Not really. A move against the Baltic Republics, the only one to be technically feasible, would entail long-term isolation and would not achieve much. The almost inevitable partitioning of Kosovo, the northern province rejoining Serbia, may be enough of a nominal consolation.

In any case, the Russian public opinion is currently focused on a more extraordinary event: the turning of the Emir into a Vizier after next elections. A good subject of conversation.

This is how the world goes.

Nationalities in Europe: Confederacy or Commonwealth?

The European Union started as a future confederacy, all it has become is an intricate commonwealth. Both have their own advantage. It is however important to neither mix the two things up, nor consider them as mutually exclusive. A confederacy or confederation can emerge within a commonwealth and be a part of it. Conversely, not all members of the commonwealth wish to participate in a confederacy. Trying to reform the European commonwealth in order to turn it into a confederation would be a mistake, for members actively resisting such integration will always be found. The two entities are compatible as long as they remain separate.

The British (or should I rather say the English?) are experienced and comfortable with commonwealths. They reject the idea of a confederation, for a good reason among many. UK is the only country in Europe entirely made of clearly distinct nations placed under the domination of one, and odds are high that several of them would obtain quasi-independence as autonomous parts of a confederation. Scotland and Wales do not have the critical mass to be actual countries in the modern world, but could become direct participants in a confederation, severing more ties with England than what they have already been doing. The more diluted the European Union, the safer Westminster is. Italians, for symmetrical motives, are inclined towards a confederation: as none of their rival regions ever succeeds in dominating all others, more European integration can only reduce their persistent tensions, while preserving the concept of Italian unity. Belgium is placed in a similar situation, with none of the two provinces being able to takeover.

Some other countries in Europe also have serious problems with their nationalities, but these are minority problems of a different nature. Spain is the main one with Basques and Catalans, followed by Greece with the Turks in Cyprus. Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia, or Corsican separatists in France do not have as much momentum and resolve. As Greece, Romania and Slovakia are most unlikely to be initial members of a European confederation, the only real question mark comes from Spain which, until now, has been demonstrating strong pro-European inclinations (while keeping a close eye on its historical ties with Latin America).

A commonwealth, in any case, doesn’t help solve such issues. Being indefinitely extensive, even the presence of Turkey in the current commonwealth is easily conceivable, whereas its presence in a European confederation would hardly make any sense. A confederation can only happen between countries willing to share at least the same currency, and common physical borders, a step already taken by many. They must also accept to form a joint constituency and elect a confederate administration endowed with actual (yet not exclusive) judiciary, diplomatic and military responsibilities. This does not look totally unrealistic if we consider at least the initial core countries of the EU, too strong to leave all their military decisions to NATO, too weak to act separately and by themselves on any significant scale. In agreement on most international issues, they also share more or less the same economic and social model.

European integration was put at a standstill by its extension to Central European nations. No matter the structure of institutions, there was no way so many actors could to be in agreement on all major policies, or could build anything else than a forced free market economy, opposed to the views an traditions of countries that had initiated EU. France was the first one to back off, vetoing by referendum the treaty of Nice. This does not mean that the confederal idea is dead. Having supported and ratified the so-called ‘mini-treaty’, which effectively ends the institutional deadlock, France has proven to be back in Europe. With his Mediterranean Union initiative, the French President is also trying to show that a loose commonwealth can be added to a tighter one, a concept Germany is reluctant to accept. Would a loose confederacy within a tight commonwealth be agreeable to both of them? That’s about all it would take to make it happen.

A small European confederation would inevitably become the dominant element in the large European commonwealth, an unpleasant prospect for some other members, but one they could do little to prevent, as any move towards unification can be made within the framework of the established system of “reinforced cooperation”.

As it is already hard to understand the past, I shall certainly refrain from predicting the future. All I can hope is that clarifying what EU has become, i.e. an over-administrated (and under-managed) commonwealth, may help find new and perhaps more reasonable solutions. Reasonable solutions are rarely the most probable, and yet may never be deemed impossible.

This is how the world goes.

Springtime for Nukes

If you ever doubted that hierarchy of information is as important as content of information, your opinion may have to change. On January 22, 2008 The Guardian published an article announcing that five of the former armed forces chiefs from the main Western countries had formally recommended a radical change in NATO’s strategy, focussed on pre-emptive nuclear strikes. You may not have heard of this, as the announcement was better echoed in Iran than anywhere else. But I suggest you take it seriously.

John Shalikashvili was supreme allied commander in Europe, before serving as chairman of the US joint chiefs. Klaus Naumann was chairman of Nato’s military committee and top strategist of the alliance. Lord Inge was chief of the general staff, then chief of the defence staff in UK. Henk van den Breemen was Dutch chief of staff. Admiral Jacques Lanxade was French chief of staff and head of intelligence. Five people, no less than 25 stars among them. Persons of this kind are rarely prone to whims, particularly when acting together, and taking a most official step. They were probably feeling that their respective governments and the administration of NATO were favourably disposed. They are not academics, philosophers or theorists. They are doers, fully convinced of the superiority of action.

Without entering into the details of their manifesto, we are clearly confronted with a complete reversal of the accepted nuclear strategy of “dissuasion”: nuclear weapons where to be used only in retaliation, making rival nuclear powers who might have contemplated an idea of first strike think twice. The new concept is to actually make nuclear strikes even in the absence of an immediate nuclear threat, or even against an enemy deprived of nuclear weapons.

This carries severe logical implications. The probability of nuclear blasts taking place will surge dramatically, especially as the manifesto also recommends switching from a unanimity rule to a majority one. The range of possible targets will extend from a limited number of nuclear powers to the entire world. The nature of events justifying a strike will now include any threat subjectively perceived as major by the strikers. Non-NATO nuclear powers will be led to adopting the same strategy for their own account. Countries allied to victims of such strikes will be placed in a situation of retaliation.

The paradox is that these events are taking place at a time when the US are now strong of half of all classical forces existing on the surface of the earth, and possibly over two thirds if NATO is included, an imbalance never seen since the beginning of mankind. It is true that nuclear forces, which are cheaper to build and maintain than classical armies, represent a limit to the use of classical forces. No one for instance would consider lightly attacking North Korea. By the way, this is the main motive of the acceleration of nuclear programs both in North Korea and Iran. Thus, a rational mind would have thought that the best strategy for the West would be, not the extension of nuclear strategies, but just the opposite: a global and concerted elimination of nuclear warfare, in order to guaranty a complete superiority of classical forces.

Seen from a political angle, it would be much easier and would appear much more legitimate to avoid proliferation in a formally denuclearised world than in a world where a handful of nations are nuclear (including the only one having actually used them) and all others are to be considered second-rate or rogue states.

Let’s have a nightmare. One of these days General Musharraf’s regime will fall (want to bet?), and is most unlikely to be replaced by a government more favourable to Western interests. Now, what would you prefer? A Pakistan having already accepted to denuclearise together with all nuclear powers including India, or a nuclear Pakistan in hostile hands against which NATO would be contemplating a first strike?

The future administration in Washington will decide for us. Technically it has the capacity to lead a drastic move which would be both favourable to US interests (due to their classical dominance) and would strongly contribute to restoring America’s image in the world. Russia is not unlikely to follow, as this would mean getting rid of the ballistic missile defence that the US are expanding in Europe. Other nuclear states are mostly US allies, with the exception of China which is the only power in actual grade to kill such a project. This last element implies that the attempt may fail. If it does, we would not be worse off than before. If it succeeds the world will be definitely safer.

Do you think that our 25 stars generals have considered this before launching their first strike initiative?

You probably know by now how the world goes.