Persian dreams

Is there any limit to how deeply Washington can misunderstand the world? Persia is a showcase for the negative answer. Since the 1953 coup at least, now officially acknowledged as the US operation ‘Ajax’, American foreign policy has been going from one misconception to another: notably, from a candid Carter administration pressuring the Shah into exile and triggering Khomeini’s revolution, to the staggering reinforcement of Iran by the destruction of its nemesis and main regional counter-weight, Iraq. Now, when the US position in the Middle-east would have seemed to reach its nadir, a series of clumsy moves indicate that things could still worsen.

The Obama administration is wise in trying to defuse the explosive situation left by the last presidency. This is not a good reason, however, to play naively in the opponent’s hand. The belief that the mere prospect of entering in Washington’s good grace will move the Iranians to the tears and will be sufficient to get their badly needed assistance or neutrality, looks like the idea of a dreamer or a madman. It is, though, what the DOD seems to have in mind.

NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Bantz J. Craddock just came up with the astonishing idea to ‘allow’ NATO state members to ask Teheran for supply routes into Afghanistan. Why not ask Pyongyang for intelligence support about China? General Craddock avoided requesting personally Iran’s assistance in better invading a neighboring country, and hinted that Germany or France would be welcome to make the first move. After an initial chuckle, Teheran might in fact take the ‘bait’: wouldn’t it be nice to have a say in any further deployment of NATO countries in Afghanistan? After all, the more the Iranians facilitate the switching of troops from Iraq to Afghanistan (at the considered levels which are way too low to bring a real military control), the easier it becomes for them to take over Iraq directly or by proxy. In the event you believe this was a whim from some isolated general, please note that the US Treasury one-sidedly labeled the Kurdish resistance movement against Iran a ‘Terror Organization’ on the next day.

It is difficult to understand why Iran is such a puzzle for the United States. The simple reading of a history book should be enough to make it clear that Persia is used to being a unified super-power (the only one who could resist the Roman empire), with a long patriotic – now nationalistic – tradition, and viewing itself as a matrix of culture. The basic mistake is to see a contradiction between an appetite for modern technologies and the safekeeping of local traditions, including Shiite Islam. Iran is not interested in becoming a part of the Western world, as many Iranians are convinced that US technological superiority is temporary and hides a cultural deficiency. It is therefore perfectly logical to combine an industrial and military modernization, financed by enormous mineral resources, with an effort to promote Shiite values all over the world, starting with the Middle-east and central Asia, the two mains parts of Persia’s courtyard. As long as the curve of American decline –which is seen as inevitable – does not cross Iran’s recovery curve, Teheran can rely on a strategy which has proven its efficiency: war by proxy and martyrdom. This low-cost method was capable of creating chaos at will in Lebanon and in Iraq, leaving Iran as a key-player in both places. It is now applied also with success In Palestine; where Israel is considered by Iran as nothing but a US stronghold. This strategy could be turned anytime against Saudi Arabia and the emirates, once the Palestinian showdown is settled under terms found acceptable by Teheran.

It is now too late to prevent Iran from building up a Mesopotamian hegemony after the departure of US forces. Western presence in Afghanistan does not represent a threat for Iran, as only massive investments (an option now closed by the economic crisis), not additional (and yet insufficient) troops could have made a US success conceivable there.

To complete the picture, the Russian-built nuclear reactor of Bushehr will be operational by the end of the year, in spite of constant Western opposition. Moreover, the acquisition of a military nuclear capacity is not unlikely over the next 2 years. Inside Iran, the search for this capacity is considered natural and legitimate, as a guaranty against US/Israeli arsenals and the repeated threats of invasion expressed during the past decades. It is kept as unofficial as the Israeli (now obsolete) nuclear bomb.

The idea that the next elections or the elections after next will dramatically alter this perception, strategy and power position is sheer wishful thinking. Mahmud Ahmadinejad is obviously not a very educated man, considering his poor knowledge of world history, but is neither the author of Iran’s present political vision nor will he be its last defender. No indication whatsoever has been given that Iran would embrace a complete or even a significant reversal of strategy after his fall.

Within this context, the West is right now clearly in a weaker situation than Iran in the Middle–east and Central Eurasia. Granting with condescendence a reintegration into the ‘concert of nations’ will achieve nothing under the circumstance. If anything can be certain in world affairs, no doubt the sudden US need of Iran will but raise all stakes. The opening of talks, the reduction of diplomatic anathema, the reluctant acceptance of Iran’s inevitable civilian nuclear industry and the lifting of ineffective economic sanctions will not be enough to obtain Iran’s passive neutrality. It would additionally take a settlement in Palestine, the only way to contain Iran’s proxies in the South.

Preventing the Persian nuclear bomb, would require an even bolder move. As suggested already in a previous post, only a military denuclearization of the Middle-East and central Asia could offer an alternative attractive enough for Teheran. The concept is not entirely new, but its time may have come. If the US administration is not ready for it, its main rival in this key region will be virtually impossible to contain for quite a long time.

This is how the world goes.

Rationality vs. Nationalism in the Palestinian conflict – Part II

Public opinion is as strong a force as it can be blind. Sides are usually taken according to the proximity of the respective propaganda sources. Historical rectifications are conceived as aggressions, and self-righteousness reigns on all parts. A rational approach can still be attempted, with limited chances of success. It is however the last resort left for not dying or killing based on utterly wrong reasons. The worst in never certain, after all.

 Let’s start by putting the historical background aside, as it is unable (as we have seen in the previous post) to show us anything else than the extreme relativity of the foundations of all opposing claims. The present issue is not anymore the historical legitimacy of Israel or of a Palestinian State, which is simply dry wood for the flaming ideologies. We should rather consider the rationality and efficiency of the strategies now determining the future of Palestine and Israel.

 The basic objective fact is the following: although at this time militarily unmovable, Israel is facing a lethal danger if the state of war persists indefinitely, because of Israel’s vital dependence on external supports which in turn depend on public opinions that are emotionally inclined to back victims. In an environment where nationalism feeds political analysis with its own notions, when confronted to a conflict between State-haves and State-have-nots, public opinion tends to back the have-nots. Even Congress can abandon a cause it was supposedly ready to die for, when a shift in public opinion starts blowing the whistle of a new electoral tone. Gradually, appalling TV images undermine the most solid positions: South Vietnam, the former ‘bulwark of our liberties’ is long gone and only one example of what it is fact a general rule when you look at it close enough. Many Israeli leaders know it; most Islamic extremists know it too. For this very reason, and sometimes for other motives, most Israeli are aware of the necessity for Israel to make a Palestinian State happen, and most Islamic extremists are convinced they will get one sooner rather than later.

 The issue therefore boils down to the negotiating muscle of the respective parties. The Palestinian strength rests almost exclusively on the public opinion battle, a battle in which Israel has been continuously losing ground since the First Intifada. The weakening of PLO, the war in Lebanon, the building of the wall, the retaliatory incursions into the West Bank, the one-sided withdrawal from the Gaza Strip followed by siege and reinvasion, all carried much more negative consequences than positive ones from the public opinion standpoint, no matter how much sense they might have made for other purposes.

 Symmetrically, the strategy adopted by the Islamic Extremists has recently shown to be much more efficient than the one of the Moderates. It consists in deliberately worsening the situation through aggressive martyrdom: provoking the opponent in order to become a martyr in the eyes of public opinion. Such strategy, the (non-aggressive) roots of which are to be found in the Christian martyrs (who took over the Roman Empire), in the pacifist Indian martyrs (who took the upper hand against the British Empire) or even in the martyrdom of Haile Selassie facing Mussolini, is extremely powerful and should not be underestimated. Triggering a full scale invasion with numerous civilian victims, by launching psychologically dreadful and yet physically almost harmless series of homemade missiles (3 dead at this time), is almost as winning a strategy as having children throw stones at tanks. It is much more efficient than the ill-designed methods of Al-Qaeda (spectacular destruction of civilian targets, and human bombs, especially women or children) which turn to be somewhat counter-productive for the goal pursued by their authors (i.e. the elimination of the United Sates from the Islamic world).

 Countering such a politique du pire cannot be done by simply accusing opponents to be terrorists, criminals, primitive or stupid, even when they are. It can definitely not be done by a sheer repression; hoping to exhaust the opponent’s determination while actually reinforcing it (Please note that Hamas leaders gave themselves the pleasure of initially rejecting the ceasefire in their favor, and asking for more martyrdom). It can only be done by offering terms that public opinion – right or wrong – will consider fair.

 The core of such terms has been known for a while, and it is probably a mistake to keep them under the table in order only to hopefully maintain one’s bargaining position. To be viable, the future Palestinian state must be territorially unified, have a critical size and the capacity to economically and socially absorb the refuges under decent conditions. It must be exempt from enclaves justifying major claims. Territorially, this implies not only the restitution of almost all Occupied Territories, but also some concession on the status of Jerusalem. A delicate issue seems to be the Right of Return, yet more apparent than real: the combination of a moratory with a viable Palestinian State should logically lead a majority of former refugees to waive it. Palestinian concessions will be essentially limited to the formal acceptance of the negotiated borders and the actual banning of terrorist activities, under the control and assistance of an adapted International police force.

 It is likely that the next Israeli government and the new US administration will give it a try to a certain degree, the main problem being to find counterparts to negotiate with, in the absence of a strong moderate Palestinian leadership. As it is neither in the Hamas nor in its Iranian backer’s immediate interest to pursue a rapid peace which would reduce considerably their role and influence, the only sound option for Israel is to create the conditions for a political comeback of the Fatah. This could hardly be achieved in the absence of an intermediary phase during which the extend of the territorial concessions that are being considered is publicized, the settlements are methodically dismantled, response to attacks while remaining firm is restrained and targeted from a distance, the daily life of Arab Israeli and Palestinian workers in Israel – an important link – is proactively improved, and the reelection of the few Arab Israeli MPs facilitated.

 This is of course faster said than done. At least this sets a reasonable course of action, foreign to ideologies and partisanship. The coming elections in Israel and the visible aspiration of the new US administration to get out of the hornet’s nest give it at least some minimal possibility.

 At some point, for peace to eventually take place the Iranian pressure will have to be released. I doubt mere ‘conversations’ will do the job, unless a trump is put on the table. The only pacific one I could see is the prospect of an International conference on the global denuclearization of the Middle-east, which is no not entirely impossible as a good way to temper the region.

 If none of this happens, if no real attempt is made to enact a reasonable plan prepared by intermediary phase, Israel will survive but its situation will continue to degrade. Both local populations will continue to undergo unsafety or misery and extremists will thrive.

 I am not sure bookmakers would bet on a rational development rather than an intensification of nationalism. Yet, who knows?

  

 

 

Rationality vs. Nationalism in the Palestinian conflict – Part I

Few topics are subject to more irrational partisanship than the Palestinian conflict. Any discussion of historical claims or legitimacy issues is a sure way to reach a quick dead-end, the particular complexity of the regional history being buried under a thick layer of ideological beliefs and errors. Here is a quick reminder.

 The very name Palestine was given by Emperor Hadrian to his province of Judea, as a punitive symbol after the bar Kochba revolt. He also simultaneously renamed Jerusalem Aelia Capitolina and banned the Judeans inhabitants from the city. Palestinia was a transposition of a word used by Herodotus for the land of the Philistines, these descendants of the People of the Sea (including the Phoenicians), a mixture of Indo-European populations having invaded the so-called ‘Asian’ territories of Egypt during the 12^th century BCE. The renaming was nothing but an expression of the Roman aggravation in front of the obstinate refusal of the Judean Bedouins to integrate the Empire: at the time of Hadrian, very little was actually left from the former Philistines in Judea, except a small presence around Gaza.

 For most of its long history the territory today known as Palestine (corresponding more or less to the southern part of the Roman province of Judea Palestinia) was subject to a series of realms and (mostly) empires: including but not limited to Cannaites/ Phoenicians, Egyptians, Hittites, Hebrews, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Franks, Mongols, Turks and British.

 As to the Hebrews, they dominated the area as a group of beduinic tribes over the 11^th century BCE. A short-lived unified kingdom lasted for about one century until the death of Salomon (-933). It was then divided into a Kingdom of Israel in the North (10 tribes) and a more destitute kingdom of Judah in the South (2 tribes). In -733 the Kingdom of Israel was thoroughly annihilated by the Assyrians. In -586 the Kingdom of Judah was in turn destroyed by the Babylonians and its modest population deported to Iran (soon to be called Persia).

 The Persians rebuilt Judea as a buffer state against Egypt, reintroducing part of the Hebrews in the area and rebuilding their temple in Jerusalem. When Alexander conquered Persia, a significant part of the local population was sent to the new city of Alexandria. Judea remained a Greek dominion until the Romans took over.

 Following their preference for indirect rule, the Romans allowed the creation of a Judean client-state under a Jewish (new name for the Hebrews) dynasty, the Hasmoneans (-138), replaced in -37 by the mixted (Greco-Edomite-Nabatean-Jewish) Herodian dynasty. A succession of revolts, mainly in 66-73 and 132-135, ended in direct Roman rule followed by the exile of most of the remaining Jewish population.

 Beduinic armies coming from the Arabian Peninsula conquered the region in 637, defeating both the Persians and the Romans (now the Byzantines), and converting most of the population to Islam. Palestine was thereafter placed under the domination of a succession of Islamic empires almost never run by Arabs but by a mixture of Turco-mongols or even European conquerors or slaves, until the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire after WWI.

 In 1881, before the arrivals of the firsts Zionist migrants, the population in Palestine was limited to 457.000 souls (400.000 Muslims, 40.000 Orthodox Christians and 17.000 Jews). As the Arabian conquest did not take the form of a migration, it is reasonable to believe that a significant part of the Muslim population of Palestine was then formed by descendants of the Roman Jews converted to Islam.

 The recent part of the story is the direct consequence of the rise of Nationalisms, from the mid 19^th century on. Nationalism, a French creation, is the invention of mythical common origins in order for a culturally or geographically connected group to claim a right of absolute sovereignty over a territory. Please recall that the Normans and Britons were Vikings, French monarchs Germans, Provence Roman, then Germanic, then Arabic, before integrating the German empire of Charlemagne, that Burgundy was German and Spanish, that Picardie was annexed by Louis XIV, and that Savoy and Nice joined France 20 years after Senegal. The unification of 200 German speaking principalities, in spite of their deep religious divisions, under Prussia (a State artificially created during the Crusades), was a response to French imperialism. The historical existence of a ‘German nation’, however, rested on even weaker grounds than the one of a ‘French nation’.

 A Jewish nationalism was soon to follow, first as an intellectual reaction against these evolutions, then as a practical escape from their dire consequences. A vast majority of the European followers of the Jewish religion were settled inside the Russian empire. Some were certainly actual descendants of the exiled Hebrews; many others were the descendants of Turkic populations converted to Judaism over time (such as the Khazars). Some were preserving their ethnic idiosyncrasies; others were assimilating into the dominant Christian fabric.

 The pogroms which had followed the assassination of Czar Alexander II, as well as the Dreyfus affair in France, triggered a sudden growth of Jewish nationalism. In spite of its shaky foundations, the idea was then accepted that all the Jews in the world (then speaking in excess of 130 different languages, and having very distinct ethnic characters and genetic origins, including Yemenites and north-African Berbers among several others) were nothing but the very same Hebrews that had been dispersed by the Persians and the Romans. About ¼ migrated to America and British dominions, ½ were exterminated by the Germans, and a good part of the remaining ¼ took step by step the road to Palestine.

 Last but certainly not least of all, the Arab nationalism had taken birth out of the decaying corpse of the Ottoman Empire. Populations who had little in common, except a language (more or less) and a religion started feeling a common origin and a common destiny. Their new origin was of course as mythological as in all other nationalisms, and their common destiny an illusion. Various ‘nationalisms’ were attempted by trial and errors: from Arab at large, to Palestinian, via Syrian, etc. At the end of the day, no actual ‘Arab’ nation took birth, and – except in Egypt- the nationalisms adopted the artificial divisions introduced by the British Empire and secondarily by France.

 Only one area of the former Ottoman Empire, Palestine, could not be filled by an Arabic state, as the Zionist migration first and then the creation of the state of Israel made it impossible. Both Arabs and Israeli refused to even imagine a common state. The question then became: would the Arab-speaking populations of Palestine be the only ones without a State reflecting their nationalistic aspirations? Both Jordan and Lebanon had by then acquired enough identity to prevent their territories from turning into a solution for the missing Palestinian element. Backed by the United States of America, Israel was now militarily invincible and could not be removed. Fueled by an anti-American sentiment, most Arab states (and later the Islamic Iran) funded the terrorist turn of the Arabic resistance in Palestine.

 While the nationalist ideology was reaching a climax both among the Jewish Israelis and the Muslim Palestinians, the most powerful force in contemporary politics – public opinion – was called to take sides.

 (to be continued)